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At the end of 2010 there are more than 100 new preferential trade agreements being 
contemplated. At the same time there are approximately 200 existing trade agreements 
whose provisions leave large additional potential gains from trade on the table. Despite 
these potential benefits, there appears to be little enthusiasm for recontracting efforts 
centred on existing agreements. This suggests that there is an inefficient deployment of 
scarce negotiating resources. Exceptions do exist, such as the European Union, which 
has strong institutional mechanisms – including, in particular, the Commission – that 
foster further market integration. While the EU’s institutional model may not be 
suitable for all preferential agreements, incorporating a formal recontracting 
mechanism into new agreements will provide opportunities to garner additional gains 
from trade in the future.    
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NAFTA Commission Meeting Postponed, No New Date Announced 
A meeting of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Commission scheduled for last week was postponed due to scheduling 
conflicts, according to a spokeswoman with the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. The NAFTA Commission meeting was scheduled to take 
place in Mexico, although the agenda was unclear. 
World Trade Online, Dec. 7, 2010 
referential trade agreements
1 are the current flavour of the month in international 
relations. All of the major economies are seeking out new partners with which to 
negotiate the lowering of trade barriers and other impediments to international 
transactions. The United States is in negotiations with a number of countries, with 
completed agreements awaiting ratification, e.g., agreements with South Korea, 
Colombia, and Panama, among others. The European Union and Canada are 
negotiating a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Viju, Kerr and 
Mekkaoui, 2010). India and the EU are in talks that could bring together India’s 
market of nearly a billion people with the world’s largest developed-country market 
(Khorana, et al., 2010). Canada is also moving forward with a preferential trade 
agreement with India. China and Japan are separately pursuing economic partnerships 
with a range of countries. There is a major regional (broadly defined) effort being 
fostered by the United States to realize a Trans-Pacific Partnership. Politicians laud 
the jobs and other economic benefits they are assured will come and, of course, enjoy 
the photo opportunities. Business leaders often join the politicians on official trips to 
explore the potential opportunities, while protectionists fume and lobby. The media 
analyses, pundits make measured pronouncements and academics organize 
conferences. If it is not exciting, at least it is something new. 
Currently more than two hundred preferential trade agreements have been notified 
to the World Trade Organization, and more than one hundred potential agreements are 
being negotiated (ICTSD, 2010). Illustrative of the focus on the new is the Trans-
Pacific Partnership which is being negotiated between the United States, Australia, 
New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam and Peru, 
with Japan and Canada still considering whether or not they wish to be party to the 
negotiations (ICTSD, 2010). There is a large overlap in membership between this 
group and the membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC), 
which is now old having been established in 1989. APEC was once considered a 
dynamic and innovative approach to trade liberalization that embraced open 
regionalism (Yeung, Perdikis and Kerr, 1999). Instead of attempting further progress 
towards liberalization through APEC, the United States, which is seen as the driving 
force behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership, has opted to negotiate a new agreement. 
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An APEC summit in November 2010, in contrast, was long on platitudes but short on 
any concrete action (ISTSD, 2010). Meanwhile, APEC members China, Japan and 
South Korea, which are not part of the prospective Trans-Pacific Partnership, are 
slated to begin negotiations on a preferential agreement in 2011. While there may be 
differences in the agendas for those separately negotiating new agreements to foster 
trade liberalization in the Pacific Region, there is a cost for the businesses that actually 
engage in trade activities of being faced with a plethora of rules. 
Of course, some new initiatives have the potential for large liberalization payoffs. 
These opportunities relate to countries that have been largely closed to trade until 
recently – in particular, India and China. India is singularly active in attempting to 
overcome its previous economic isolation. It has completed negotiations with the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is currently negotiating 
bilaterally with the European Union (Khorana et al., 2010), Canada, Japan, Malaysia, 
Thailand, New Zealand, Sri Lanka and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). It is 
contemplating agreements with Turkey, Indonesia and Australia. 
China is also very active in seeking agreements to secure sources of supply for 
natural resources, but these types of agreements do not qualify as WTO-recognized 
preferential agreements. According to Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), preferential trade arrangements – customs unions (CUs) 
and free trade areas (FTAs) – are allowed by the WTO. The GATT, however, requires 
that these agreements cover substantially all trade and that existing external tariffs 
should not be raised by the countries concluding the FTA.
2 Article XXIV of the GATT 
stipulates that 
A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (…) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories (WTO, 
n.d.). 
It seems it is always easier to capture the imagination of those who have the 
ability to make things happen with something new. At universities, core teaching 
departments languish while new schools and institutions are founded, siphoning 
resources and talent. It is also true that universities are littered with institutes that are 
little more than nameplates on doors at the end of musty, dimly lit corridors – their 
money gone and the talented people decamped for newer opportunities. While much 
of what is cast aside in this somewhat deterministic process may have simply been the 
embodiment of the flavour of the month when they were established, and thus did not 
provide much of value, others that make important contributions are similarly allowed 
to die on the vine in this way only because they are no longer new and sexy. William A. Kerr 
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The globe is littered with preferential trade agreements that are long forgotten by 
everyone but the academics that study these things. Many from the 1960s, while they 
remain on the books, were never actively implemented – the major benefit was 
probably the photo opportunity that accompanied their signing. Others, however, that 
were major forces of liberalization, economic expansion and market integration now 
languish – one shot deals that have become part of the institutional backdrop of the 
economic environment. In many cases, however, while there have been major benefits 
from the liberalization brought by the agreement, considerable benefits from further 
market integration among their existing members remain to be tapped. 
One major example of this outcome for a preferential trade agreement is the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As the quote that begins this paper 
indicates, the NAFTA is now low on the list of political priorities, with nothing 
particularly interesting or pressing to discuss. Negotiating resources are scarce and 
one suspects that the scheduling difficulties for the United States were related to the 
concerted attempt to complete the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement that was 
competing for those resources. The NAFTA Commission is the senior institutional 
forum of the agreement but is not taken particularly seriously by the three contracting 
parties. The unrealized economic potential from further liberalization of the North 
American market is immense, significantly larger than that available from, for 
example, a trade agreement between the United States and Korea, much less the 
economic benefits for the United States of an agreement with Colombia or Panama.
3 
The NAFTA, however, is no longer new and sexy. 
The NAFTA was the darling of its time, and its initial success may have been the 
spur for the major change in U.S. trade policy away from an almost exclusive focus on 
multilateralism to the multitracked, bilateral, regional and multilateral approach that 
has pertained over the first decade of the 21
st century (Kerr and Hobbs, 2006). Aspects 
of the NAFTA such as its dispute settlement system and the investment chapter were 
to be models for the reformed GATT that grew into the World Trade Organization 
(Apuzzo and Kerr, 1988).
4 Although the success of trade agreements is very difficult 
to measure because agreements are implemented over long phase-in periods where 
many other factors affect trade flows and performance of the economy – meaning that 
holding everything else constant to isolate the effect of the trade agreement is a 
significant challenge (Abler, 2006)
5 – there is widespread acceptance that the NAFTA 
has led to increased economic activity. Trade liberalization, as with any change in 
public policy, creates losers and well as winners, and the NAFTA has many critics. 
Those critics make further progress on liberalization politically difficult, but the 
potential benefits remain large and currently represent a lost opportunity. William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   5 
 
The NAFTA is a free trade area. Thus, it represents only the first step on the road 
to achieving a truly integrated market. The next logical step from an economic 
perspective would be the creation of a customs union with a common external tariff 
(Meilke, Rude and Zahniser, 2006). This would simplify trade among the three 
countries considerably by removing the barriers required to prevent circumvention of 
the tariffs of high-tariff countries – those pertaining to rules of origin. There are also 
likely gains from a wide range of regulatory harmonization – everything from the 
grading of agricultural products (Kerr, 1992; Kerr, 1997) to mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications. Government procurement remains restricted to a 
considerable degree. The list of professions that can take advantage of temporary 
work visas is short. The range of services which are open to firms from the other 
NAFTA partners is restricted. Hence, moving the NAFTA forward to new levels of 
market integration could have a large economic payoff, yet it is hardly being discussed 
in Washington, Mexico City or Ottawa. 
One of the major problems is that the NAFTA has no recontracting provision. A 
recontracting provision provides an institutional mechanism to move the process of 
liberalization forward. For example, the WTO allows for the initiation of a new round 
of negotiations. A central feature of the WTO’s recontracting mechanism is its 
forward-only or no-backsliding provision, which means members can be assured they 
will not lose any previously gained concessions if they agree to having a new round. 
In the Doha Round, this principle is facing a major test. In the negotiations it has 
been agreed that as part of the special and differential treatment that developing 
countries are to be extended there is a special safeguard provision for agricultural 
product imports. In essence, this is an anti-surge mechanism to allow developing 
countries to better deal with market-disrupting short-run increases in imports. If a 
surge of imports meets the criteria set out in the special safeguard provisions, then the 
importing country is allowed to impose temporary duties to limit market access. 
The Doha Round agriculture negotiations pertaining to the special safeguard have 
centered on questions of the appropriate import quantity increase trigger, the 
appropriate price decline trigger and the appropriate level of duties to be imposed 
once the trigger levels have been breached. Most of the attention has focussed on the 
import quantity increase trigger. The appropriate level of duties, however, will depend 
on the size of the quantitative surge and/or price decline. One of the proposals put 
forward by developing countries would allow, under certain circumstances, for the 
duties that could be imposed to exceed the current – Uruguay Round – bound tariffs. 
From the point of view of some members of the WTO this would be backsliding and, 
hence, they have vigorously opposed it. For them, violation of the forward-only William A. Kerr 
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principle would set a very bad precedent – one that could threaten the future efficacy 
of the entire WTO. If backsliding were to be allowed, they suspect that obtaining an 
agreement to proceed with new rounds of negotiations in the future would be virtually 
impossible – for the same reasons that Canada and Mexico will not agree to 
renegotiate the NAFTA. Canada and Mexico perceive that the U.S. Congress would 
only agree to renegotiate the NAFTA if some of the current concessions could be 
clawed back. Given the unequal bargaining power between them and the United 
States, such demands would be hard to resist. 
The inability of the negotiators to bridge the gap over backsliding was the formal 
reason6 given for the suspension of the Doha Round negotiations in 2008 (Valdes and 
Foster, 2008). After the collapse of formal negotiations, informal discussions on the 
issue have not produced any results.  While it is clear that a recontracting provision 
cannot guarantee that there will be trade liberalization, having the ability to launch a 
new WTO round without fear of losing what has been achieved is a valuable 
mechanism from an institutional perspective. 
The European Union has the strongest institutions to foster trade 
liberalization/market integration. The WTO is a relatively passive institution in terms 
of moving the trade liberalization agenda forward. The WTO provides a venue where 
the member states can negotiate when a round is agreed. Once a round is agreed, the 
Secretary General can exhort the member states to successfully conclude a round. It is 
the member states, however, that agree to having a round and to what will be on the 
negotiation agenda. 
In the EU’s institutional structure, the Commission has a formal responsibility to 
foster and promote the single market. The Commission draws up plans with the 
objective of moving towards achieving the single market. Of course there are a large 
number of checks in European Union governance, which means that simply because 
the Commission proposes measures that will lead to further market integration, they 
don’t necessarily come to pass. Not all countries have adopted the Euro, even when 
they have met the criteria; not all countries have joined the Schengen Group of 
countries that have eliminated all internal border controls; and national referendums 
with negative results have forced the renegotiation of major proposals for EU 
constitutional changes. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have 
complex voting rules or vetoes over Commission proposals. The European Court also 
acts a check on the Commission’s attempts to foster increased market integration. 
The important point is, however, that there is an institutional mechanism with a 
formally defined role to devise the means to move toward evermore integration of the 
economies of the member states. This strong recontracting institutional arrangement William A. Kerr 
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has, of course, yielded impressive results. The European Union has gone further along 
the process of deep economic integration than any other preferential trade agreement. 
It has also had sufficient success to make it attractive for new members to join. The 
prospect of joining the European Union generates genuine excitement among those 
slated for accession – even if it is far in the future. When additional countries join, it 
gives the EU a new look and new designations, e.g., EU-12, EU-15, EU-25, EU-27. 
Alternatively, in the early years of the NAFTA other countries expressed an interest in 
joining, e.g., Chile and some countries in the Caribbean and Central America. One no 
longer hears such interests being expressed. 
The ability of the European Union to remain fresh is in no small part due to the 
key role given to the Commission. The momentum generated by the Commission 
leads to continuing recontracting, so that the EU never becomes stale old news but 
rather, if not new, it at least appears renewed. Certainly, the EU seeks out new 
preferential arrangements with other parties, but this does not detract from its central 
purpose of deepening integration. 
In contrast, the NAFTA has no recontracting provisions. Its institutions purposely 
were kept weak (Meilke, Rude and Zahniser, 2006). There is no proactive institution 
such as the European Commission that can act as the NAFTA’s voice (Kerr, 2002). 
Those who negotiated the NAFTA saw there was a need to continue the process of 
market integration through the removal of non-tariff barriers and the harmonization of 
standards. In the NAFTA they mandated the establishment of a number of committees 
that were to work toward further market integration. With a few exceptions, these 
have not worked as intended. They have simply become venues to talk and talk 
without any mechanism to force closure on issues (Kerr, 2006). After decades they 
have not accomplished even simple things such as the harmonization of beef grading. 
Thus, the NAFTA is essentially a one shot deal. While the NAFTA arrangement may 
represent the true appetite in the three countries for market integration, there is no 
mechanism to test that proposition. Without an institutional arrangement that allows 
formal proposals for recontracting, there is no way to establish whether progress on 
market integration is desired. It seems odd, given that the ambition of the NAFTA is 
quite modest, and hence the gains from further progress likely would be considerable 
(Meilke, Rude and Zahniser, 2006), that there would not be considerable support for a 
further deepening of market integration. As with the case of the European 
Commission, checks could easily be embedded in a new arrangement to ensure that 
proposals that did not have broad support would not be accepted. 
As suggested above, there are more than one hundred new trade agreements being 
negotiated. Part of the enthusiasm for new preferential trade agreements is a result of William A. Kerr 
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the apparent inability to successfully conclude the Doha Round of multilateral 
negotiations. What is hard to fathom is that there is little enthusiasm for recontracting 
within the two hundred preferential trading agreements that have already been notified 
to the WTO. Most of these agreements have only just scratched the surface in terms of 
the economic gains available from further liberalization. Although there has been a 
focus on the NAFTA in this paper, many other preferential agreements fail to garner 
any attention regarding the potential rewards from further integration. This failure 
represents considerable forgone opportunities. 
The lesson is that those negotiating the hundred-odd new preferential 
arrangements should build in formal mechanisms for recontracting. This will allow 
these agreements to escape being relegated to being solely a backdrop feature of the 
international commercial environment and instead continue to foster the achievement 
of gains from trade. While the institutional model provided by the European Union, 
with its ever-proactive Commission, may be too deterministic for the members of 
many new preferential trade agreements, institutional arrangements for recontracting 
that provide opportunities for moving forward can be devised. Such arrangements will 
allow scarce lobbying and negotiating resources to be deployed where the potential 
gains from trade are the largest, whether through further deepening of existing 
agreements or agreements with new partners. Of course, the potential gains from trade 
must be tempered by assessments of the probability of success when decisions 
regarding where scarce resources should be committed are taken. 
There would appear to be bias toward the negotiation of new preferential trade 
agreements relative to the recontracting of existing agreements. This bias likely leads 
to inefficient results in terms of the gains from trade that are available. Hence, 
institutional arrangements for recontracting should be included in new preferential 
trade agreements. William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   9 
 
References  
Abler, D. (2006) Approaches to Measuring the Effects of Trade Agreements. 
CATPRN Commissioned Paper CP 2006-1, Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy 
Research Network, 
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~catprn/PDF/Commissioned%20Paper%202006-1.pdf 
Apuzzo, A. M., and W. A. Kerr (1988) International Arbitration – The Dispute 
Settlement Procedures Chosen for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. 
Journal of International Arbitration 5(4): 7-15. 
ICTSD (2010) A New Growth Industry: Trade Pacts Outside the WTO. News and 
Analysis, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, December. 
Kerr, W. A. (1992) Removing Nontariff Barriers to Trade Under the Canada–United 
States Trade Agreement: The Case for Reciprocal Beef Grading. Journal of 
Agricultural Taxation and Law 14(3): 273-288. 
Kerr, W. A. (1997) Removing Health, Sanitary and Technical Non-Tariff Barriers in 
NAFTA. Journal of World Trade 31(5): 57-73. 
Kerr, W. A. (2002) NAFTA and Beyond: Challenges for Free Trade in the 
Hemisphere. Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 3(2): 
224-238. 
Kerr, W. A. (2006) NAFTA’s Underdeveloped Institutions: Did They Contribute to 
the BSE Crisis? In K. M. Huff, K. D. Meilke, R. D. Knutson, R. F. Ochoa and J. 
Rude (eds.), Agrifood Regulatory and Policy Integration Under Stress, 213-226. 
Guelph: Texas A and M University/University of Guelph/Intituto Interamericano 
de Cooperacion para la Agricultural-Mexico. 
Kerr, W. A., and J. E. Hobbs (2006) Bilateralism – A Radical Shift in US Trade 
Policy: What Will it Mean for Agricultural Trade? Journal of World Trade 40(6): 
1049-1058. 
Khorana, S., N. Perdikis, M. T. Yeung, and W. A. Kerr (2010) Bilateral Trade 
Agreements in the Era of Globalization. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Loppacher, L. J., and W. A. Kerr (2006) Rules for Foreign Investment – The US 
Agenda in Bilateral Trade Agreements. The Geneva Post Quarterly 1(2): 195-229. 
Meilke, K. D., J. Rude, and S. Zahniser (2006) The Search for “NAFTA Plus” and a 
Strategic Bargain in the North American Agrifood Sector. Invited paper presented 
at the North American Agrifood Market Integration Consortium workshop, 
Calgary, 1-2 June, http://naamic.tamu.edu/calgary/meilke.pdf. 
Moodley, R. D., W. A. Kerr, and D. V. Gordon (2000) Has the Canada-US Trade 
Agreement Fostered Price Integration? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 136(2): 334-
354. 
Valdes, A., and W. Foster (2008) After the Collapse: Rethinking the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Country Agriculture. News and Analysis, William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   10 
 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Vol. 12, No. 4, 
August. 
Viju, C., W. A. Kerr, and C. Mekkaoui (2010) Everything is on the Table: Agriculture 
in the Canada-EU Trade Agreement. CATPRN Commissioned Paper, No. 2010-
01, Canadian Agricultural Trade and Competitiveness Research Network, 
(http://www.uoguelph.ca/~catprn/PDF/Commissioned_Paper_2010-03_Viju-
Kerr-Mekkaoui.pdf. 
World Trade Online, Dec 7, 2010, http://insidetrade.com. 
WTO (n.d.) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV: Territorial 
Application — Frontier Traffic — Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas. World 
Trade Organization,  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXIV 
Yeung, M. T., N. Perdikis, and W. A. Kerr (1999) Regional Trading Blocs in the 









 William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   11 
 
Endnotes 
                                                      
1.  The term preferential trade agreement has replaced the term regional trade 
agreement as countries seek out trading partners outside their regions. Of course, 
the term regional trade agreement as well as bilateral trade agreement are used 
when appropriate – all are preferential trade agreements.   
2.  This provision has never been tested at the WTO. Many preferential trade 
agreements, for example, exclude large segments of agricultural trade (Viju, Kerr 
and Mekkaoui, 2010; Kerr and Hobbs, 2006).  
3.  Of course, having preferential access to the U.S. market may be beneficial for 
smaller countries such as Colombia or Panama. 
4.  Despite considerable effort, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 failed to inspire inclusion of a 
Multilateral Investment Agreement in the WTO (Loppacher and Kerr, 2006) 
5.  The required ceteris paribus conditions are difficult to achieve in empirical studies 
(Moodley et al., 2000). 
6.  Others think the problems with the special safeguard mechanism are only a 
convenient excuse for the myriad of issues where the member states of the WTO 
cannot reach agreement. No backsliding, however, was a sufficiently strong 
principle to force the issue. 